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I
STRucruRE op Tm HOUSING MARKET
When one speaks of the "housing market" he is in reality referring to four inter-
related submarkets: (i) newly constructed single-family houses not yet sold or
occupied, (2) new rental units, (3) previously occupied units being offered for resale,
and (4) previously occupied units offered for rent.' In this article we shall focus our
attention on new housing, submarkets (i) and (2), but we shall by no means ignore
the influence of previously occupied resale and rental units on purchases of new
housing.
Since World War II expenditures for the purchase of new housing have been
estimated to be about four per cent of Gross National Product (GNP). If one
includes expenditures for equipment, furnishings, services, and so on which accom-
pany the purchase of new housing, then the broader class of expenditures for new
housing approaches twelve per cent of the GNP.2
Three different groups of individuals make decisions to construct new houses:
(i) individuals who contract for or build a house for their own use, (2) builders who
start houses that they expect to sell to new owner-occupiers, and (3) builders who
start rental units. Although the percentages of new housing starts in these three
groups vary widely from month to month, in the early i96os the market was
roughly divided one-quarter, one-half, and one-quarter respectively.8 In analyzing
the structure of the housing market, we shall concentrate on the decisions by builders
to start construction on houses for sale or rental. We will not consider separately
decision by individuals to build for their own use. We shall assume that individuals
who build for their own use have the same impact on the market as builders and
developers.
To facilitate our analysis of the housing market we shall make use of the flow
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chart in figure i. The broken lines in figure i denote informational flows and
the solid lines denote construction flows. Central to our flow chart of the housing
market is the builder. He must continuously make two different types of decisions:
(i) how many private housing units should be constructed and (2) what should be
the size, quality, and value of each housing unit?
At any given point in time the stock of private dwellings HU.&v_ is equal to the
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TABLE I
TOTAL HOUSING STOCK IN THE UNITED STATES ON APRIL 1, 1960
Available Vacancies (HUvAc) .................................. 1,975,000
Total Occupied=Total Households (HH) ....................... 53,021,000
Total Available Dwellings (HUAvL) ............................ 54,966,000
Source: Maisel, Nonbusinas Condrudi n in THE BROOKINGS QuArEaLY ECONOMrTRC MODEL OF ,m' UNITED STATES, Ch. 0. at 190(1965).
number of households or occupied houses HH plus the number of houses which
are vacant and available for occupancy HUvo.4 That is,
(I) HUAvL = HH + HUvAo
For example, the total housing stock in the United States on April I, i96o, is given
in table i. Changes in the stock of houses occur when new houses are completed
and when old houses are removed. Mathematically, the change in the stock of
private housing may be described by the following identity,
(2) AHUvL = HUiN - HUJEm
where AHUAvL denotes a change in the housing stock, HU-IN denotes housing units
completed, and HU Em denotes net removals of housing units. From equation (I) it
follows that AHUvw may also be expressed as
(3) AHUvL = AHH + AHUvAo
The number of completions during time period T depends on the number of
housing starts HUsTs in time periods T-i, T-2, etc. Therefore, completions are
identically equal to net household formation plus the change in vacancies and net
removals,
(4) HUYIN = AHH + AHUvAC + HUn.mt
Our principal concern in this article is with the process by which builders decide
to increase, decrease, or hold constant the number of housing starts. The level of
housing starts in any period is by definition equal to the sum of four variables,
(5) HUsTs = AHH + HUREM + AHUvAo + AHUuo
where AHUuo is the change in the stock of housing units under construction. Table
2 shows the disposition of private housing starts between April I, i95o and
March 31, 196o.
Suppose that the housing market is in equilibrium at the beginning of planning
period T. Builders start exactly enough houses to maintain a constant stock of
housing units under construction. Completions are exactly equal to increases in
the demand for housing (household formation plus removals),
(6) HUFIN = AHH + HUEM
In attempting to decide how many houses to construct during planning period
'Throughout this article we use notation developed by Sherman J. Maisel.
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TABLE 2
DxsPosinow OF TOTAL EsnMATED STARTS OF PI-VATE HousING UmTs IN THE UNITED STATES
APRIL I, 1950 TO MARCH 31, I960
Net Additions to Households (AHH) .......................... 9,645,000
Net Removals (HURE ) ...................................... 2,833,000
Increase in Available Vacant Units (AHUvAc) .................. 1,245,000
Change in Inventory under Construction (AHUuc) .............. -37,000
Total Private Housing Starts (HUsTs) .......................... 13,686,000
Source: nisl , A Theory of Flucuations in Residential Construction Starts, 53 A . EcoN. nov. 359, 361 (1963).
T, builders estimate the change in the actual number of new dwelling units coming
into the market during planning period T. That is, builders make conjectures about
the magnitude of changes in the stock of houses as a result of completions during
period T. The number of completions in period T depends upon (I) the number
of starts in preceding periods, (2) the amount of resources committed by the builders
to the completion process in period T, and (3) exogenous factors such as weather,
strikes, and so on, which are beyond the control of builders. Builders also make
conjectures about the change in the demand for housing (AHH + HURI,) during
planning period T. If builders conjecture that the increase in aggregate demand for
housing during the planning period is likely to exceed the number of completions
during that period, then conjectured profits will be relatively high and builders will
increase the number of housing starts and increase the rate at which houses under
construction are completed. On the other hand, if builders conjecture that
completions will outrun the rate at which housing demand increases, vacancies will
build up, conjectured profits will decline, and builders will cut back on housing starts
and slow down completions. Builders are continuously making new conjectures
about the housing market in the light of additional information which becomes
available to them. Housing starts and completions are in turn continuously adjusted
to reflect these changes in the builders' forecasts about the future.
What are some of the factors that cause builders to adjust the number of housing
starts and the rate at which they employ resources to complete houses? Grebler and
Maisel have developed a partial list of factors which affect builders' decisions about
housing starts: 5
I. Changes in population
a. Increase in population
b. Changes in the age-sex composition
c. Changes in the number, type, and size of households
d. Internal migration and immigration
5 Grcbler & Maisel, Determinants of Residential Construction, in Comm IssIoN ON MONEY AND Ca.EDrr,
IMPACTS OF MONETARY POLICY 476-77 (z963).
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2. Changes in income and employment
a. Total disposable personal income: past, current, expected
b. Income distribution
c. Employment and unemployment
3- Consumer asset holdings and their distribution, especially liquid assets and
equities in existing houses
4- Changes in the prices of housing
a. The price elasticity of housing relative to other prices
b. The shape of the construction supply and cost curves
5. Relationship between occupancy costs and prices of dwellings
a. Credit availability and the cost of credit
b. Real estate taxes and operating expenses
c. Depreciation
d. Imputed costs of equity funds
6. Consumer tastes and preferences
7. Net replacement demand for dwelling units demolished or otherwise removed
from the inventory less net conversions and mergers of existing units.
8. Conditions in the existing housing supply
a. Utilization of the housing inventory
(i) Vacancies
(2) Intensity of occupancy
b. Prices and rents for existing dwelling units
c. Quality, location
9. Reaction to changes in demand
a. Builders' organization and profit expectations
b. Investors' organization and profit expectations
c. Market structure and market information
We have condensed these nine factors into three general categories in figure I:
population factors, economic factors, and housing market factors. Each of these three
factors is simultaneously determined by four variables: governmental fiscal policies,
governmental monetary policies, federal housing programs, and exogenous variables
such as weather, individual tastes, wars, and strikes, to mention only a few. In the
remainder of this article we shall give particular attention to the impact of fiscal
and monetary policies on the housing market.
II
BEHAVIOR OF THE HousiNG MARKET IN THE ig6OS
Housing production as measured by housing starts "has earned the dubious
distinction of ranking among the most cyclically volatile industries." During the
6 Maisel, supra note i, at 359.
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postwar years prior to 196o housing starts tended to rise sharply during recessions andduring the early stages of recovery periods, reaching a peak about six months after
the low point in general business activity. Throughout the remaining period of
expanded business activity housing starts would continue to decline, thus providing
a constraint on other expansive forces at work in the economy.
FIGURE 2




Source: U.S. DEP'r op Com cE.
During the 196os the U.S. economy has been characterized by a period of record
expansion which began in early 1961 and continued through the end of 1966. Housing
starts during this period have behaved in a manner which differs significantly from
the pattern established in the earlier postwar years. (See figure 2.) There was no
obvious upturn in housing starts prior to the beginning of the recovery period ini961. The subsequent upswing in housing starts was quite mild, lasting only threeyears and reaching a peak in 1964. Although the economy as a whole was continuing
to expand in late 1966, housing starts dropped to an annual rate of i.o million units
in the fourth quarter of 1966.
What caused the disappearance of the vitality which housing starts had displayed
in the 195os?
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
In previous cycles, housing had frequently moved contra-cyclically, rising in
recession years because of low interest rates and abundant credit and then being
choked off in recovery as rising demand for credit raised rates and shut off the flow
of funds. While interest rates remained stable and funds were readily available,
housing nevertheless responded only sluggishly and peaked out in early x964j
Alhough no precise reason can be given for the relatively sluggish performance
of the housing market in the i96os, a partial explanation may be a decline in the
underlying demand for housing in the x96os.
With the tremendous blacklog of demand having been worked off in the i95o's,
housing activity in the early i96o's did not surge forward as money became easy.
In contrast to earlier experience, monetary policy in this latest expansion remained
easy for a long time, and this probably contributed to the prolonged rise in housing
activity, despite weaker underlying demand. The latter factor finally outweighed
the stimulus of easy money and housing starts began drifting down from an annual
rate of about 1.6 million units in early 1964 to about 1.5 million units in early 1966.
Since that time a sharp rise in mortgage yields and reduced availability of mortgage
credit have contributed to a precipitous drop.8
With the boom in apartment construction in the 196os, the composition of resi-
dential construction has also changed considerably. In i960, multi-family housing
starts represented twenty-one per cent of total housing starts. In 1963, they repre-
sented thirty-seven per cent of total housing starts.
III
IMPACT OF FiscAL POLICY ON THE HOUSING MARKET
The line of causality which links governmental fiscal policy with housing starts is
far more complex than is implied by the flow chart in figure i. Changes in gov-
ernmental fiscal policy affect aggregate demand (GNP) both directly and indirectly
through a series of complex multiplier and feedback mechanisms. Changes in GNP
may, in turn, affect disposable personal income, income distribution, employment,
price levels, and so forth. Housing starts are sensitive in varying degrees to each
of these economic parameters.
In general, two different types of fiscal policy instruments are available to the
federal government-revenue policies and expenditure policies. Revenue policies or
tax policies are those policies which determine: (i) personal income tax rates, (2)
corporate profit tax rates, (3) indirect business (excise) tax rates, and (4) contribu-
tions to social insurance (social security and Medicare). Conventional wisdom
(macroeconomic theory) postulates that for given federal expenditure patterns, an
increase (decrease) in tax rates will lead to a decrease (increase) in GNP. A decrease
(increase) in GNP will indirectly affect housing starts by inducing changes in the
intermediate economic variables (disposable income, employment, prices, and so on)
7 FEDmL.L REsERvE BANK OF RICHMOND ANN. REP. 8 (1966).8 1d. at 26.
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listed above. These economic factors may also affect certain demographic variables
which tend to influence housing starts.
Alternatively, governmental policy makers may also affect GNP by increasing or
decreasing governmental expenditures in the form of (i) transfer payments or (2)
purchases of goods and services. Transfer payments include payments to individuals
in the form of social security benefits, Medicare benefits, unemployment compensa-
tion, and so on. For given tax rates, an increase (decrease) in government spending
will usually lead to an increase (decrease) in GNP. As mentioned before, a change
in GNP may trigger a change in housing starts.
Although there is general agreement among economists that governmental fiscal
policy has substantially influenced the U.S. economy during the expansion period of
the i96os, it is difficult to say to what extent fiscal policy affected the housing market.
During the I961-1966 expansion three types of governmental expenditures grew
rapidly: expenditures for defense, expenditures for social security and older welfare
programs, and expenditures for new welfare programs. On the revenue side, two
innovations appeared during the i96os. First, two important measures were intro-
duced specifically to reduce business taxes. These included liberalized depreciation
allowances and a seven per cent investment tax credit. Second, there was a major
reduction in personal and corporate income taxes in 1964 at a time when business was
expanding and the budget was still showing a sizable deficit. Deficits in the federal
cash budget were registered in every quarter but two during this period and usually
ranged well over $i billion. The expansionary effect of these deficits was especially
important as is evidenced by the fact that GNP increased by nearly fifty per cent
during this period. However, in late 1965 and early 1966, as the economy began to
approach full employment, these deficits generated strong inflationary pressures.
On the basis of this brief sketch of some of the major developments in govern-
mental fiscal policy in the 196Os and on the basis of a cursory glance at the time path
of housing starts during this period (figure 2), one can conclude that the relation-
ship between fiscal policy and the housing market is somewhat less than straight-
forward. While the U.S. economy was responding vigorously to expansionary fiscal
policies, the housing market demonstrated, at best, a "mixed" performance. It is
virtually impossible to say anything meaningful about the relationship between
fiscal policy and the housing market without resorting to sophisticated econometric
models. In the following section we shall describe the results of several simulation
experiments with alternative fiscal and monetary policies in which an econometric
model was used to evaluate the impact of these policies on the housing market.
IV
IMPACT oF MoNETARY POLICY ON THE HOUSING MARKET
In grossly simplified terms, the purpose of monetary policies administered by the
Federal Reserve Board is to influence the supply of money in the U.S. economy.
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Policies which tend to increase the supply of money available in the economy will
lead to reductions in interest rates. Lower interest rates stimulate consumption and
investment. Increased consumption and investment mean higher aggregate demand
as well as increased personal income and employment. In terms of the housing
market, lower interest rates imply lower credit costs; and, in theory, lower credit
costs should stimulate the demand for housing.
In assessing the probable effects of interest rate changes on consumers' demand
for credit for housing expenditures, however, it is important to recognize a purely
numerical phenomenon. Aside from net income tax advantages associated with
various amounts of interest payments, the mere fact that the typical mortgagor
makes constant monthly payments on a very long-term mortgage means (i) that
small changes in contractual interest rates have relatively little effect on the monthly
payment (2) that, in turn, this latter change itself is likely to have only a small
direct effect on consumers' demand for credit.9
As was the case with fiscal policies, the line of causality and functional relation-
ships between monetary policy changes and the behavior of the housing market are
extremely complex. Hypotheses concerning the nature of these relationships require
extensive testing and verification before one can attach operational significance to
them.
Three major policy instruments are available to the Federal Reserve: (i) the open
market purchase and sale of U.S. Government securities, (2) changes in the reserve
requirements of member banks, and (3) changes in the discount rate, i.e., the interest
rate charged to member banks by the Federal Reserve. The terms "tight money"
and "easy money" are sometimes used to differentiate among alternative monetary
policies. A "tight money" policy is one which tends to restrict the supply of money
by (i) the sale of government securities, (2) raising reserve requirements, and (3)
increasing the discount rate. "Easy money" policies are characterized by (x) the
purchase of government securities, (2) decreased reserve requirements, and (3) lower
discount rates.
Needless to say, one should proceed with extreme caution in advocating a par-
ticular monetary policy to achieve a specific goal in terms of interest rates, price levels,
personal income, or employment. The pioneering work of Frank De Leeuw10 and
others at the Federal Reserve Board represents an initial attempt to quantify the
effects of monetary policy on U.S. financial markets. De Leeuw's model has also
been used as a sector of The Brookings Quarterly Econometric Model of the United
States thus providing a linkage between monetary policy and the behavior of the entire
U.S. economy. Unfortunately, it is impossible to adequately describe these two models
and spell out their relationship to the housing market within the constraints imposed
on the length of this article.
" W. J. FRAZER & W. P. YoHE, supra note 2, at 406.10De Leeuw, A Model of Financial Behavior, in THE BROOKINGS QUARTERLY EcoNoMETRIC MODEL OF
THE UNITED STATES 465-530 (1965).
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During the expansion period of the I96Os, monetary policy can be briefly sum-
marized as follows: Between 196o and 1963 the Federal Reserve followed an active
"easy money" policy. In early 1963 the Federal Reserve began moving toward a
policy of "restrained ease" which continued through 1964. In late 1964 the economy
began showing signs of overheating. Beginning in 1965 the Federal Reserve moved
further in the direction of "tight money." By 1966 a "tight money" policy was
being pursued vigorously.
Turning to the relationship between monetary policy and housing starts, we
observe in figure 2 that during the period of "easy money," when interests rates
were relatively low and credit was readily available, housing starts increased in num-
ber. However, when the Federal Reserve turned to a "tight money" policy, housing
starts reached a peak and turned downward at a rapid rate. By the spring of 1966
there was a severe squeeze on the market for mortgage funds. The situation had
become so acute for potential home builders or buyers and for the construction in-
dustry that the Federal Reserve put into effect several special measures designed to
channel additional funds into the mortage market.
Perhaps the most promising attempt to date to evaluate the impact of monetary
(and fiscal) policies on the housing market is the paper by Gary Fromm entitled
"An Evaluation of Monetary Policy Instruments."" Fromm uses The Brookings
Quarterly Econometric Model of the United States and computer simulation tech-
niques to evaluate four different monetary actions and two fiscal policy alterna-
tives.12  The version of the Brookings Model used by Fromm consists of 176 simul-
taneous equations. The financial sector of the model numbers over thirty equations.
Of particular interest to us is the fourteen-equation nonbusiness construction model
developed by Sherman J. Maisel which is contained within the complete Brookings
Model. Maisel's model relates nonfarm residential construction to a number of
variables including: (i) a housing cost index; (2) housing starts in periods T,
T-i, and T-2; (3) total available housing; (4) the implicit price deflator for nonfarm
construction; and (5) the implicit price deflator for GNP. The model also includes
an equation which expresses housing starts as a function of: (i) changes in the
number of households; (2) net removals of housing; (3) vacant available housing
in period T-i; (4) the rent component of the consumer price index in period
T-x; (5) average market yield of three-month U.S. Treasury bills; and (6) housing
starts in periods T-i and T-3 .
In Fromm's simulation experiments the discount rate, average reserve ratios re-
quired against demand and time deposits, and the unborrowed reserves of member
banks (controlled by Federal Reserve open market operations) were treated as mone-
'Presented at the annual meeting of the Econometric Society, Sad Francisco, December 29, 1966.
" Computer simulation is defined as a numerical technique for conducting experiments on a digital
computer with a mathematical model describing an economic system. See T. H. NAYLOR, J. L. BALiNrFY,
D. S. Burn)ic & K. Cru, CompuTaER SInuLATION TECHNIQUEs (1966).
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tary policy instruments. Given the structural coefficients of the equations of the
Brookings Model and certain other exogenous variables (i.e., population and govern-
mental expenditures), then the model determines the values of the endogenous
variables which describe the system. Six separate simulations were run. The simu-
lations included four different monetary policy changes and two different fiscal policy
changes. The monetary policy changes were: (I) a cut in the discount rate, (2) a
reduction in the time deposits reserve requirements, (3) a reduction in the demand
deposits reserve requirements, and (4) an increase in unborrowed reserves (open
market operations). The fiscal policy changes were: (i) an increase in government
durables purchases and (2) a reduction in personal federal income tax rates. In
each simulation, all other parameters and exogenous variables remained unchanged.
A control simulation was also run. All of the simulations were for the mid-i96o
through 1962 recession period (seven quarters). The control simulation represents an
approximation to the actual behavior of the economy during the i96o-62 period.
The simulations provide some indication of events that might have taken place had
the above monetary and fiscal policy changes been instituted at the end of the
second-quarter of i96o.
The two fiscal policy changes had relatively little impact on nonfarm residential
construction. Of the four monetary policy changes, the reduction in the demand
deposits reserve requirements and the increase in unborrowed reserves stimulated
nonfarm residential construction by the greatest amount over the seven-quarter
period. The cut in the discount rate had the greatest sustaining effect on the
housing market. For all of the policies, with the exception of the discount rate
reduction, the impact on business plant and equipment investment is greater than
the impact on nonfarm residential construction. This implies that the responsiveness
(elasticities) of business investment to changes in interest rates and income are
greater than the responsiveness of nonfarm residential construction to changes in
interest rates and income.
V
THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL HOUSING PROGRAMS ON THE HOUSING MARKET
In addition to fiscal and monetary policies, the housing market is also affected
by a number of governmental housing programs. These programs include:
i. Veterans Administration
2. Department of Housing and Urban Development
a. Federal National Mortgage Association
b. Public Housing Administration
c. Federal Housing Administration
3. Home Loan Bank Board
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The principal aim of the Veterans Administration (VA) and the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA) is to make available credit for home purchases by
insuring the lenders of funds against loss. The Veterans Administration guarantees
at no cost a portion of the value of loans to eligible veterans, thus eliminating or
greatly reducing the usual cash down payment for the purchase of a home. The
federal housing program is an insurance program under which approved lenders are
insured for the full amount of their mortgage loans in return for a premium paid
by the home owner. "One of the effects of the VA- and FHA-underwritten mort-
gages, however, has been to cause housing expenditures to vary, at times, counter
to the short cycle of income, output, and employment."13  The objective of the
Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae") is to increase the liquidity
of government-insured mortgages (VA and FHA) by providing a secondary market
facility to widen the market for government-insured mortgages. The Federal Home
Loan Bank Board, a part of the Home Loan Banking System, provides credit to
home financing institutions. The Public Housing Administration has focused its
attention on the development of low-rent housing facilities for lower-income families.
What effects have these programs had on the housing market?
Considerable literature exists on the effects of Federal housing programs on the
composition of residential construction and on short term fluctuations. Most of it
is of the verbal-qualitative type. With one exception, the statistical-econometric
models at best concern themselves with the effects of changes in credit conditions
generally, without attempting to examine and quantify the component sources of
such changes. The long-run impact on the level of construction has had relatively
little attention. Yet, whether the extensive housing aids offered by the Federal
Government have helped raise the level of new construction or accelerate the growth
of the housing sector would seem to be a strategic question.14
Although the average yield on FHA- and VA-home mortgage loans would appear
to be seemingly obvious credit variables in evaluating the impact of federal housing
programs on the housing market, because of intricacies in the mortgage market
(e.g., discounting) they are, in fact, poor measures of the cost of credit. In con-
cluding his econometric study of the housing market, Maisel stated:
Because credit is an important government policy variable, significant changes
in past relationships may occur which must be considered in analysis and fore-
casting. Clearly, if the Federal Reserve succeeds in breaking past relationships
between the Treasury bill rate and the availability and cost of credit,... [housing
starts] will be affected. Even more important may be the changing policies of
the Federal National Mortgage Association. In this study [Maisel's study],
FNMA intervention in the credit market appeared significant on theoretical
grounds, and nearly so on a statistical basis. However, since FNMA action was
closely related in time to interest rate movements, it did little to increase our sta-
1 W. J. FRAZER & W. P. YoRE, supra note 2, at 408.
Grebler & Maisel, supra note 5, at 584.
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tistical explanation of past movements. Even though this collinearity did result in
insignificant [regression] coefficients . . . [in an equation relating FNMA policy
to housing starts], it seems logical to assign direct governmental intervention of
this type a good deal of weight, even if only subjectively. 15
VI
SUMMARY
We have outlined a number of possible relationships between fiscal and monetary
policy, as well as federal housing programs, and the housing market. Although a
large number of empirical studies of the housing market have been conducted, none
of these studies has as its principal aim the delineation of relationships between fiscal
and monetary policy (and governmental housing programs) and the housing market.
The major conclusion of this study is, therefore, that there is considerable need for an
econometric model of the housing market which includes as instrumental variables
(i) fiscal policy instruments (2) monetary policy instruments, and (3) federal housing
program instruments. Until such a model is constructed, generalizations about the
relationship between these policy instruments and the behavior of the housing market
can at best be termed "speculative."
"5 Maisel, supra note i, at 378.
